by P.D. Lesko
Several abortion-related Michigan laws have been found unconstitutional in light of a 2022 state constitutional amendment enshrining reproductive rights, the state appeals court ruled on Nov. 17. Specifically, the Michigan Court of Appeals was asked to rule on whether Judge Sima G. Patel of the Michigan Court of Claims had improperly ruled that MCL 333.17015 and MCL 333.17015a, amended in 2023, violated the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Appeals struck down a mandatory 24-hour waiting period, and affirmed last year’s ruling by Judge Patel that blocked provisions on obtaining consent and counseling prior to an abortion, including requiring women seeking abortions to view pictures of fetuses.
Northland Planning Centers East and West, along with a group called Medical Students for Choice had brought suit in the Michigan Court of Claims naming the Attorney General, Director of the Dept. of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, and the Dir. of the Dept. of Health and Human Services. According to the Court of Appeals’ opinion, “Plaintiffs, identifying themselves as abortion providers and advocates, commenced this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend that MCL 333.17015 and MCL 333.17015a contravene the recently established state constitutional right to reproductive freedom, rendering these statutes unconstitutional.2 The challenges presented are predicated on four specific mandates imposed on abortion procedures as articulated in the statutory language: (1) a 24-hour mandatory waiting period, (2) uniform informed consent requirements, (3) a physician participation mandate, and (4) mandatory screening for coercion.”
In 2022, Michigan voters approved Proposal 3 to amend the Michigan Constitution and establish an individual constitutional right to reproductive freedom. This constitutional right is located in Const 1963, art 1, § 28, which provides as follows: (1) Every individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care. An individual’s right to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means.
In 2025, The Court of Claims held a bench trial, where it heard the testimony of the parties’ experts. Following trial, the Court of Claims issued an extensive, thorough, and well-reasoned written opinion and order holding that the provisions creating the mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the uniform mandatory consent requirement, and the physician mandate, along with other provisions in the statute that were inextricably linked with these provisions, were unconstitutional. The court issued a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of those provisions, which were MCL 333.17015(1), (2)(d)-(g) and (i)-(j), (3)-(10), (11)(a)-(h), (13)-(14), and (18)-(20).
Judge Patel’s “though and extensive” 2025 opinion, according to the Court of Appeals Nov. 17 opinion, found that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period imposed by the Legislature in 2023, and presented by the defendants as necessary to “protect patient health,” instead “burdened and infringed the right to reproductive freedom.” The Court of Appeals quoted Judge Patel: “Against the mountain of expert opinions and citation of accepted clinical standards and medical literature submitted by plaintiffs establishing that the challenged laws do not protect patient health and are contrary to accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine….The mandatory 24-hour waiting period infringes upon autonomous decision-making. The waiting period forces needless delay on patients after they are able to consent to a procedure, thus burdening and infringing upon a patient’s access to abortion care.”
The two men and one woman panel of Court of Appeals judges concurred with Judge Patel. In their Nov. 17 opinion, the trio of jurists wrote: “We note that the absence of a mandatory waiting period does not inhibit any patient from deliberating or reconsidering an abortion decision at her own pace. Indeed, the evidentiary record before this Court demonstrates that patients approach the decision to terminate a pregnancy with varying degrees of contemplation, and that the time required for a considered decision is highly individualized. The imposition of a categorical 24-hour waiting period, therefore, is not only untethered from patient autonomy but also operates as a blanket restriction that fails to accommodate the spectrum of patient circumstances.”
With this decision, Michigan’s mandatory 24-hour waiting period prior to an abortion remains struck.
The Court of Appeals also found the Defendants’ arguments concerning the necessity of “informed consent” as unpersuasive as had Judge Patel. In her opinion, Judge Patel reasoned, “It would burden or infringe upon reproductive rights to ask if such a patient would like information about contraception. Forcibly giving DHHS-produced materials on the subject without a request is paternalistic and stigmatizing, making the patient feel belittled for becoming pregnant….A patient seeking to terminate a pregnancy does not require information about the growth of a fetus. The information is coercive and stigmatizing as the only reason for requiring it is to dissuade an abortion patient.”
The Court of Appeals concurred and the Nov. 17 opinion states, “The challenged uniform informed consent statutory provisions suffer from a critical flaw: the imposition of a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach that is fundamentally incompatible with both established medical ethics and the realities of clinical practice. Trial testimony established that competent, informed consent requires flexibility and sensitivity to the unique medical, psychological, and social circumstances of each patient. By mandating identical disclosures regardless of an individual’s needs or context, the statute disregards the professional judgment of healthcare providers and the autonomy of patients.”
Like the 24-hour waiting period, the State’s “belittling and stigmatizing” informed consent requirement remains struck.
The Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the Court of Claims erred in ruling that “the provision [that requires] screening for coercion to abort did not deny, burden, or infringe upon the fundamental right to reproductive freedom.” The Michigan Court of Appeals concurred but did not uphold the lower court’s finding: “Upon a thorough review of the record, we find no error in the Court of Claims’s conclusion that the statutory provision at issue appears, on its face, to be neutral in its protection of patients’ rights to make decisions regarding abortion free from coercion. Nevertheless, we are compelled to undertake a more searching analysis, as the mere appearance of neutrality is not dispositive of the statute’s constitutional validity under Michigan law.”
With respect to the screening for coercion, the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Court of Claims with instructions to “determine whether the statutory framework, both in its language and in its application, comports with the constitutional mandate of equal protection in the enforcement of the right to reproductive freedom. This inquiry shall require a searching examination not only of the statutory text, but also of the real-world consequences of its enforcement.”


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